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The good Arab: conditional
inclusion and settler colonial
citizenship among Palestinian
citizens of Israel in Jewish
Tel Aviv
Andreas Hackl University of Edinburgh
Dominant majorities often use idealized categories to validate the ‘goodness’ and deservingness of
minority citizens. For Palestinian citizens of Israel, this category is the ‘good Arab’. Since its origins in
early Jewish settlement of Palestine, it has become a powerful and controversial metaphor in Israeli
public discourse. As an experienced condition of limited inclusion, the ‘good Arab’ exemplifies the
Palestinian dilemma of accessing socioeconomic opportunities in Jewish Israeli spaces that stigmatize
and fend off their ethnonational identity. Combining a historical genealogy of the ‘good Arab’ with
ethnographic research among Palestinians in Tel Aviv, this article shows how a historically evolved
logic of settler colonial control and indigenous erasure continues to define liberal frameworks of
conditional citizenship and inclusion. Theorized through the emerging concept of conditional inclusion,
these insights open up new avenues for analysis and comparison in anthropological debates
surrounding indigenous struggles, settler colonialism, urban inclusion, and citizenship.
The outside world is exile,
exile is the world inside.
And what are you between the two?
Mahmoud Darwish, ‘Edward Said: a contrapuntal reading’ (2007: 176)
From a busy road in Tel Aviv, I take a stairway up to a law office, determined to sign
a new rental contract. With me is a friend who kindly offered to serve as a guarantor.
We step into the office and the landlady greets us while my friend, who is a Palestinian
citizen of Israel, introduces herself by saying, ‘Nice to meet you. I am Lina’.1 Seemingly
shocked to hear an Arab name, the landlady coldly replies: ‘What . . . are you?’ (mah
. . . at?). After a few seconds of suppressed silence, the owner sinks into an armchair
and turns to Lina: ‘So, you are Arab? Do you speak Hebrew? Do you have a job?’ As
an Israeli citizen, Lina speaks fluent Hebrew and answers that she has a job. Seemingly
unimpressed, the owner turns to the lawyer and says, ‘I ask because we only take good
Arabs, right?’ The lawyer stares evasively into a book on the desk in front of him and
nods indifferently: ‘Only good Arabs, yes’.
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As they demand ‘good Arabs’, ‘good immigrants’, or ‘good Muslims’, dominant
majorities frequently pressure members of stigmatized minorities to abide by the
standards of behaviour and identification they predetermine (Cohen 2011; Mamdani
1998; Shukla 2016). Qualifying as ‘good’ can thus become a precondition for people’s
access to citizenship and socioeconomic opportunities; it may be a prerequisite for
the positive validation of a minority’s racial, religious, or ethnonational difference.
The affected individuals can respond in various ways and must balance the pragmatic
need to meet these criteria with contrasting senses of identity. The figure of the ‘good
Arab’ expresses a particular variant of such conditional citizenship in Israel/Palestine:
it shows how a settler colonial logic of erasure becomes imbricated for Palestinians
who seek socioeconomic inclusion and access in spaces dominated by the settler
majority.More generally, the ‘goodArab’ reveals how the partial inclusion of indigenous
minorities and their recognition as ‘good’minority citizens opens conditional pathways
towards socioeconomic incorporation, while simultaneously foreclosing the possibility
of equality.
Widespread frameworks of ‘national integration’ have allowed settler elites to
consolidate an exclusive national identity in states with large and diverse populations
that do not identify with the national polity, such as indigenous peoples in the Americas
(Speed 2017: 787). Another case in point is Australian liberalism, which has maintained
an implicit hierarchy between white settlers and racialized minorities (Hage 1998).
Indeed, liberal settler states often perpetuate the legacy of colonialism and its unequal
systems of power (Povinelli 2002). When minorities struggle for equality, they may
find that their partial recognition and inclusion – rather than the outright denial of
rights – becomes anobstacle to their aims (Hale 2011: 184). A complicity of liberalismand
settler colonialism can suppress the inherent sovereignty of indigenous peoples, which
is historically rooted in the land, while making their ongoing dispossession acceptable
(Speed 2017: 788). One distinguishing factor of Jewish-Israeli settler colonialism has
been that it claimed its own ‘inherent’ sovereignty over the land in reference to ancient
and religious roots.
The ways in which Israeli liberalism today offers individual Palestinian citizens
partial access to Tel Aviv and its economy reveals how liberal regimes of urban and
socioeconomic inclusion actively suppress the recognition of indigenous sovereignty
and political identity in urban settler spaces. Despite the ongoing prevalence of
this phenomenon, settler majorities tend to locate the dispossession of indigenous
minorities in the past: a history to be reconciled with the present, perhaps, but history
nevertheless. Moreover, there is a tendency in social anthropology to rarely employ
settler colonialism as an analytical lens (Sturm 2017). When it is used, as in this journal,
the focus is often on reconciliation or ‘correcting’ the past (e.g. Blackburn 2007).
Working towards a better understanding of how settler logics continue to structure the
frames of reference for access and belonging in a society and its economy is therefore
an important anthropological project.
The specific category of the ‘good Arab’ thrives in a regime of citizenship and
conditional inclusion that is widely perceived to be separate from a history of settler
colonial erasure, although it is in fact its continuation by othermeans. The ‘elimination’
(Wolfe 2006) and ‘supersession’ (Edmonds 2010) of native sovereignty and space lives
on through the many ‘ongoing attempts of political erasure’ (Sturm 2017: 341), one
of them being conditional inclusion. Showing what is lost and what is gained as part
of such processes, I explore how a ‘permitted’ presence of minority citizens facilitates
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meritocratic access to a city dominated by the ethnonational majority. At the same
time, this ostensibly ‘liberal’ invitation forecloses equality and visibility as a recognized
ethnonational urban minority.
To be sure, Palestinians have long mounted resistance and popular opposition to
settler colonialism, and these actions have shaped the political identity of a national
liberation movement until today (Khalidi 1997; King 2007). They symbolize the
contentious ‘battles for visibility’ that Palestinians have waged alongside indigenous
minorities elsewhere (Blokland, Hentschel, Holm, Lebuhn & Margalit 2015; Feldman
2008). Yet, from the perspective of the ‘good Arab’, one may ask: what if socioeconomic
inclusion and political recognition are in fact mutually exclusive, and what if access to
a city depends on the invisibility of one’s ethnonational identity and the absence of a
visible collective presence?
My answers to this dilemma derive from more than two years of ethnography
among Palestinian citizens in Tel Aviv, between 2012 and 2014, and again in 2017.
Their daily experience entailed the need to be invisible in certain ways, often in
exchange for immersion in the city and its social or professional spaces (Hackl 2018).
Many among them were aware of the racialized figure of the ‘good Arab’, yet only
few would openly identify as such. The identity category is nevertheless socially
and politically powerful. The dilemmas behind this trope have inspired prominent
books and popular TV shows. The fictional character Amjad of the Israeli TV series
Arab labour, for example, does everything to be accepted by Jewish Israelis in the
hope of attaining their privileges. The problem is that these privileges are always
conditional.
When Norman Issa, the actor behind the fictional character Amjad, refused to
perform in a theatre show in an illegal Israeli settlement in 2015, Israel’s cultureminister
quickly threatened to withdraw support for Issa’s own theatre. Only when Issa offered
a replacement show did ministers take back their threats, with the culture minister
saying, ‘I gave him a ladder to climb down, and he used it’. The whole episode led
one commentator to proclaim that Israel has no more room for ‘good Arabs’ ‘who are
not total collaborators’ (Levy 2015). During pre-state Jewish settlement of Palestine,
the ‘good Arab’ became a label for Palestinian Arabs who collaborated with Jewish
security and intelligence officials. Today, it no longer refers explicitly to the role of
the collaborator and signifies a specific stereotype of the ‘Israeli Arab’ – a term that
misrecognizes the linkage of Arab citizens to Palestinians as a people, and to Palestine
as a territorial unit (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005).
While I define the ‘good Arab’ as a sociopolitical category, or label, ethnographic
research reveals it as a negotiated social space of inclusion. As a label, the ‘good Arab’
entails specific classifications of identity used in a powerful top-down process of
‘making up people’ (Hacking 1981). As members of the majority use this ascription
to mark out an ideal-type minority figure (Lindquist 2015: 163), the ‘good Arab’
becomes part of a national protocol of recognition, a form of ‘national intelligibility’ of
dominant sociopolitical role scripts (Stein 2008: 2-3). Behind such stereotypical scripts,
Palestinians experience and negotiate a far more complex social space of conditional
inclusion. Such ‘social space’ is always hierarchic and mediates the distribution of
socioeconomic access and inclusion unequally (Bourdieu 2018 [1991]; Lefebvre 1991
[1974]). Although aware of the racialized logic behind the ‘good Arab’, Palestinian
citizens sometimes conform with its criteria as a de-stigmatization strategy that opens
pathways to socioeconomic inclusion. This is the hidden ‘battleground’ on which they
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 00, 1-18
C© 2020 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Royal Anthropological Institute
4 Andreas Hackl
negotiate the limits and parameters of inclusion vis-a`-vis the dominant ethnonational
majority.
As settler states continue to police indigenous place-making and self-determination
in numerousways, they often do so particularly aggressively in relation to cities (Tomiak
2017). The specific context of Tel Aviv is crucial in this sense: this is the quintessential
Jewish Israeli city that symbolizes the success of the entire Zionist project. It thus poses
a tremendous challenge for the Palestinian citizens who live, work, or study there today.
Ever since its foundation, Tel Aviv has maintained an opposition to Palestinians and is
imagined as essentially Arab-free (Levine 2005; Mendel 2009). It buried its own violent
history and the Palestinian narrative underneath a powerful image of a modern liberal
city that celebrates diversity (Rotbard 2015).
The city offers opportunities that have attracted a growing number of Palestinian
citizens. Their numbers are likely in the tens of thousands, but as a high-ranking
municipality official admitted: ‘There are no official numbers.We only have numbers of
those who are registered residents’, some twenty thousand Palestinian citizens. Yet,most
of these live in historically ‘Arab’ areas of Jaffa south of Tel Aviv and the numbers do not
includemany of the two thousand or so Palestinian students at Tel Aviv University, who
never registered as residents. The overall perception is that Tel Aviv hosts a growing but
fluctuatingminority of Palestinian citizens, many of them in their twenties and thirties,
who staff its hospitals, pharmacies, restaurants, and buses, work as lawyers or doctors,
and study at its universities. This is without counting the thousands of Palestinian
labour commuters from theWest Bank who spend their week on the city’s construction
sites. In the words of one young cook who lived in the city: ‘If there are no more Arabs
in Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv will close down . . . Every second worker is Arab’.
Although this research reflects a particular context at a particular time, the ‘good
Arab’ offers an entangled and contradictory concept, rich with analytical value for
theorizing minority citizenship and conditional inclusion beyond this particular case.
It is closely related to a whole range of similar figures across diverse contexts: ‘good
Muslims’ (Mamdani 1998), ‘good immigrants’ (Shukla 2016), ‘civil citizens’ (Elias
2008 [1981]), the ‘permitted Indian’, or indio permitido (Hale & Millaman 2006), and
‘model minorities’ (Yeh 2014). Many of these tropes are identity categories within
racialized nations and neoliberal regimes that actively recognize a very limited space
for indigenous presence and minority citizenship (Hale & Millaman 2006: 284). This
pattern mirrors the old dichotomy of good nobles and bad savages in the Anglophone
world (Berkhofer 1978), or that between the docile indigenous labourer and the
treacherous insurrectionary Indian (Stavenhagen 1992).
The following review of this historical and conceptual genealogy of the ‘good Arab’
will explore these patterns. Ethnographic profiles then demonstrate how Palestinian
citizens navigate this regime of conditional inclusion in Tel Aviv. Exploring the ‘good
Arab’ in ethnography and theoryultimately reveals the ambivalent interplaybetween the
discourses and practices that determine the in-built limitations of minority citizenship,
and the tactics that affected individuals develop in response.
The good Arab: a short genealogy
As Jewish immigration to Palestine intensified during the early twentieth century,
settlers established communities and rural colonies that required security and the
co-operation of Palestinian Arabs (Alroey 2014; Cohen 2011). Friction between the
indigenous Palestinianmajority and Jewish settlers emerged in the 1890s and intensified
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with the Balfour Declaration, which expressed BritishMandate support for the creation
of a Jewish homeland (Khalidi 1997; Robinson 2013). The spread of Jewish settlement
fuelled conflict between Arab and Jewish communities and culminated in the 1936-9
Arab revolt, which the British crushed with the help of Jewish militias (Morris 2004:
10). As Jewish intelligence recruited collaborators to pass on important information
and support the sale of land, some of these became known as ‘good Arabs’. This
collaboration was not necessarily a dominant practice among Palestinians at the time:
they engaged in widespread resistance and mounted significant actions in opposition
to Zionism, including armed actions and unarmed civil resistance (Khalidi 1997; King
2007). However, the Jewish settlers also exploited other interests among Palestinian
Arabs, such as the desire for material gain and power under the newly emerging
regime.
Orientalist thinking defined Israeli constructions of Palestinian Arabs as
untrustworthy people who needed to be controlled tightly. Take Chaim Weizmann,
Zionist leader and first President of Israel, who remarked to Arthur Balfour that the
Arabs are ‘superficially clever and quick witted’, have a ‘treacherous nature’, and must
be watched carefully and constantly (Said 2003 [1978]: 306). Such views informed Israeli
policy towards Palestinians as a dichotomy between ‘good Arabs (the ones who do as
they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore terrorists)’ (Said 2003
[1978]: 306). At the same time, Israel constructed a near-total dichotomy between Arab
and Israeli identity (Shenhav 2006), which defined political Zionism and the practices
and policies of the Israeli state (Makdisi 2005: 444).
When the State of Israel emerged from the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Palestinians
had experienced anational catastrophe, theNakba,with the coercedflight and expulsion
of 750,000 Palestinians from the territory that Zionist forces captured (Robinson 2013:
70). Israel then extended to thosePalestinianswho remainedwithin its newboundaries a
discrete set of limited rights andduties, determined by the settler community (Robinson
2013: 3). Today’s Palestinian citizens of Israel, around 20 per cent of its population, are
for the most part the descendants of those 150-160,000 Palestinian Arabs who remained
in or managed to return to Israel between 1948 and 1950 (Pappe´ 2011: 11; Robinson
2013: 1). Although formally incorporated as citizens, they effectively lived undermilitary
rule until 1966 and were barred from expressing Palestinian national identity (Khalidi
1997: 179). Many of the policy decisions that Jewish officials made after 1948 define how
Palestinian citizens are governed today. Collectively, Palestinians were pushed into the
periphery of the economy. At the personal level, they could reap profits from economic
exchange with official bodies as long as they identified with the state (Saadi 2016: 37-8).
Although formally included as citizens, a deeper undemocratic regime logic facilitated
their dispossession and peripheralization as outsiders of the ‘dominant ethnoclass’
(Yiftachel 2000: 728).
The logic of the ‘good Arab’ gained a regional dimension in the early Israeli state,
when Palestinians felt betrayed by the post-war armistice agreement in which Jordan
and other Arab states handed over Arab land to Israel. A state can therefore become
subsumed within the logic of ‘good Arabs’ in a region shaped by colonialism and
asymmetric relations. Jordan may exemplify this as a peace treaty signatory with Israel
and a regional partner – pragmatic and accommodating, such states do not challenge
the legitimacy of Israel and focus on mutual interests instead. This has historical
parallels throughout the region: as colonialism contributed to the ‘dual society’ in
Arab countries, European commercial groups and governments found indigenous
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merchants and landowning classes who assimilated their interests to those of the foreign
communities (Hourani 2005: 295).
Israel managed to deepen its internal control of Palestinians through the framework
of conditional citizenship (Lustick 1980): it rewarded those who co-operated, while
monitoring others who did not. One was described as ‘an honest man of good character
who aids the authorities’, while many others were outlawed as ‘Israel-haters’ (Cohen
2011: 25). After the Nakba of 1948, the Israeli state worked to fragment Palestinian
society and undermine the power of its traditional structures (Saadi 2016). Soon a
new generation of Palestinians organized themselves politically and embodied a more
critical political stance. According to a report by a district representative at the time,
‘The Israeli Arab is no longer passive and has gone over to nationalistic manifestations’,
necessitating ‘a policy of reward and punishment’ (MERIP 1976: 11-12). Although the
idea that Palestinians had previously been ‘passive’ is an Orientalist mirage, the report
shows how the state increasingly combated Palestinian activism. It used collaborators
to report those who openly held nationalist positions, punishing some by blocking their
professional advancement.
The state actively reinforced the accommodationist camp and played off one
religious and ethnic community against another (Cohen 2011: 232). TheDruzeminority,
especially, became the target of state policies that emphasized sectarian particularism
while simultaneously undermining their national dimension, ‘weaning them away
from the larger Palestinian Arab community’ (Firro 2001: 41). This recalls a familiar
colonial practice of control, not dissimilar from the ‘taming’ of Algeria and Algerians
as a classic divide-and-rule politics that separated good assimilable subjects from bad
subjects, Berbers from Arabs (Prochaska 2004: 3, 234). Forging ‘good’ colonial subjects
usually depended on maintaining social peace through a civilizing mission that was
intended to discipline and pacify the natives (Cooper & Stoler 1989: 610; Jua 1995;
Shepherd & McWilliam 2013). The handing out of rewards as a form of ‘pacification’
was crucial to the continuing appeal of the ‘good Arab’: collaborators were often
assigned jobs or allowed to lease out land that the state had confiscated from displaced
owners. The military establishment wanted to prove that ‘we help those who help us’
(Cohen 2011: 27).
Collaborators or ‘traitors’ often lie at the heart of processes by which states are
made (Kelly & Thiranagama 2010). As mediators between village and state, Palestinian
collaborators sometimes held influential positions that demanded carefulmanoeuvring
between the regime and their own society (Cohen 2011: 37-8). The associated moral
ambiguity often means that such a role is treated as a distortion of political life and
identity (Kelly & Thiranagama 2010). This resonates within today’s Palestinian life
in Tel Aviv, the quintessential Jewish Israeli city that many Palestinians still consider
an illegitimate and morally polluted permanent home. Some of their brethren call
Palestinians in Tel Aviv Aravivim – a derogatory term that mixes the Hebrew words for
Arab and Tel Aviv.
This moral ambivalence features prominently in Palestinian citizens’ fictional
literature on the ‘good Arab’ in the early decades of the state (Brenner 1999). Emile
Habiby’s tragicomic bookThe secret life of Saeed the pessoptimist (2010 [1974]), originally
published in Hebrew, tells of a man who tries to be an Israeli collaborator and a
Palestinian freedom fighter but fails in both. Yoram Kaniuk’s book Confessions of a good
Arab (1988) also deals with this tragic ambivalence, although written by a Jewish Israeli
writer born in Tel Aviv. The main character in the story is ‘Yosef Sherara/Rosenzweig’,
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the son of a Jewish Israeli woman and an Arab intellectual who ultimately faces double
rejection by Israeli and Arab worlds. After serving the Israeli Mossad as well as militant
Palestinian organizations, the character states: ‘I was defeated on bothmy sides’ (Kaniuk
1988: 76). Several other prominent works, such as the novels of Saed Kashua, especially
Dancing Arabs (2004), have addressed the dilemmas of the ‘good Arab’.
Importantly, this metaphor has emerged alongside another powerful figure: that
of the Palestinian activist. After the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel occupied the
Palestinian territories, contact between Palestinian citizens and those who now lived
under Israeli military occupation intensified. Palestinians in Israel took political action
in solidaritywith theirbrethrenduring theFirst Intifada (1987-93), andafter the failureof
the Oslo Peace Process. The October 2000 events during the Second Intifada, especially,
symbolize a turning point, as they saw twelve Palestinian citizens (and one non-citizen)
killed by police fire in Israel. The events inspired ‘a new awakening’ that contributed to
the emergence of a ‘Stand-Tall Generation’ of youngPalestinianswith anunprecedented
sense of entitlement and political energy (Rabinowitz &Abu-Baker 2005). However, the
selective openness of the Israeli regime has not embraced political demands of equality
among Palestinian citizens (Ghanem & Khatib 2017: 890).
Over time, the category of the ‘good Arab’ has become a widespread metaphor for
those whomerely avoided controversial political activity and any visible demonstration
of their national belonging. Although equality remains foreclosed, Israeli liberalism
invites them to become ‘champions of meritocracy, professionalism, hard work,
universalistic pluralism, [and] freedom of individual choice’ (Rabinowitz 1997: 184).
These dynamics are exemplary of Palestinian citizens living in both Jewish Israeli and
mixed towns (Rabinowitz &Monterescu 2008). Yet it is important to remember that the
majority of Israel’s Jewish and Palestinian population live in segregated communities
and attend segregated schools, by design of the state’s official policies of Judaization
and ethnoterritorial fragmentation (Yiftachel 2001).
Mixed towns and schools remain the exception, although Palestinian mobility into
Jewish Israeli cities and spaces has intensified (Blatman-Thomas 2017). Tel Aviv, by
official definition, is not recognized as a mixed city, which lends particular relevance
to the space of the ‘good Arab’. Merely recognizing a Palestinian minority in Tel Aviv
challenges its very identity: in the words of the city’s mayor, Ron Khuldai, ‘it would
be problematic to consider it as a mixed city’ (Monterescu 2015: 126). The Palestinian
citizens have moved into Israeli cities nonetheless, where they face the daily challenge
of navigating the ambivalent territory of the ‘good Arab’.
Becoming a good Arab
In their hope to gain access to Jewish Israeli cities and the socioeconomic opportunities
there, some Palestinian citizens aspired to meet the criteria of the ‘good Arab’. This
became evident duringmore than two years of ethnography in Tel Aviv. Although I met
people with a diversity of class backgrounds and aspirations, many shared a concern
about how to adapt to the requirements of ‘success’ in this Israeli city without violating
their senses of self-worth and identity. While class differences defined the depth and
limitsof individuals’ immersion inTelAviv, doctors andcleaners alikeneeded tonavigate
the social space of the ‘good Arab’. Because the citizenship regime establishes dominant
values as ‘virtue’ and stigmatizes others as ‘vice’ (Isin 2002), Palestinians come under
constant pressure to prove their ‘virtue’ as ‘good’ citizens. Such a conditional regime
offers benefits for some and excludes others, while certain rights are enjoyed on the
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implicit condition that others will not be raised (Hale 2004). Sometimes this required
my interlocutors to become temporarily ‘invisible’ as Palestinians: a kind of invisibility
in plain sight that recalls internalized responses to racism among Black Americans
(Ellison 2001 [1952]).
The racialized logic of the ‘good Arab’ became evident in the experience of
Mohammed, a young Palestinian citizen who lived and worked in Tel Aviv. He had
already been living in the city for six years when we first met in the building in which
I lived, where he cleaned the stairs. At the bottom of the building was a hairdressing
salon that was run by a Jewish Israeli who once referred to Mohammed as ‘a nice guy,
a good Arab’. Mohammed, for his part, told me later that he did not expect the Jewish
hairdresser to be welcoming. ‘I felt he wouldn’t respect me’, he said, adding: ‘But today
I like him a lot, we sit and talk, drink coffee’.
Several weeks into our acquaintance, Mohammed and I had lunch in one of the few
Palestinian-owned businesses in Tel Aviv: a falafel and hummus eatery in a renowned
shopping street. Sitting outside the eatery, Mohammed told me about his two cleaning
jobs, but emphasized that his actual job was as a nurse in a Tel Aviv hospital. While it
would normally be unusual for educated Palestinian professionals to work as cleaners
on the side, this was common practice within Tel Aviv, especially for unmarried men,
who were under pressure to save up for a house and a future marriage.
Indeed, Mohammed was planning to get engaged soon, saying, ‘If I didn’t do all this
work, I would need a loan and I would be in debt’. Having three jobs allowed him to
maximize his income while working every day of the week. ‘Most Arabs in Tel Aviv are
like me. They work, eat, and sleep. That’s it, we don’t do more in this city’, he said,
adding that he had not slept at all the night before our meeting: after a night shift at the
hospital, he continued as a cleaner in the early morning. Mohammed felt that this hard
work was one reason why colleagues and Jewish Israeli acquaintances respected him.
Mohammed learned what it meant to be validated as a ‘good Arab’ on arriving
in Tel Aviv and needing a place to stay. When he was eventually offered his first
apartment, it turned out to be a conditional offer: the landlord asked him to find a
Jewish citizen to sign the contract instead. Only after a year did the landlord allow him
to sign. According to Mohammed, once trust was earned, ‘he did not want to let me go
anymore’. Anticipating similar problems, he made sure to reserve his next apartment at
the viewing with a down-payment. Several days later, he was meant to sign a contract,
but the owner realized he was Arab and changed his mind: it was now a one-month
agreement ‘on trial’. Mohammed said:
Then I painted everything fresh and invested a lot in the place, and they were impressed. At the
beginning, they saw me as an Arab and concluded I am not good. Today, they love me. So, it is
important for me to show them that, because I am Arab, doesn’t mean I am not a good person.
Aspiring to be recognized as a ‘good Arab’ counters the stigmawith a display of traits
that conform to values validated as ‘good’ by the dominantmajority. Rather than replace
one’s difference by, let’s say, assimilating to Israeli society, the stigmatized difference
turns into a ‘permitted’ kind of difference, and this permission must be authorized by
the stigmatizing person and requires recurring proof.
The problem is that even for those few Arab citizens who serve in the Israeli
military, conforming to the state’s requirements does not eliminate the structural
discrimination to which they and their communities are subjected (Kanaaneh 2009:
62). Although Mohammed believed in what he called ‘the revolution for the good’, he
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also recognized its limitations, saying that, ‘I am Mohammed; I am a problem’. This
recalls the stigmatization among Arab minorities in the United States, who experience
their social identity as a recurring ‘problem’ (Bayoumi 2009). The key dilemma is, to
borrow wording from Hage (2011: 121), that Israeli society ‘instils’ in the Palestinian
the aspiration to be recognized as a universal and equal individual but ‘denies them
this aspiration at the very moment it encourages them to aspire to it and believe that
they are entitled to it’; they have to ‘endure both the hope and the shattering of hope
that are part of this process’. Mohammed told me about an older resident who refused
to return his casual greetings in his building. ‘He always treated me like a dog’, he said,
explaining that he helped the old man carry his shopping bags upstairs in the hope of
changing his attitude. ‘Some people you can change, some you can’t. I still try to do it,
to emphasize respect and love and hope that it will change people’.
This reconciliatory attitude reflects a particular political trajectory and upbringing.
Mohammed was influenced by his father, who had a restaurant in the Jewish Israeli
city of Ashkelon. He once told Mohammed that he had two options to succeed as an
Arab in this country: become famous, as a football player, for example, or work hard
and earn money quietly. Although Arab football in Israel has long been a popular
‘integrative enclave’ (Sorek 2007), Mohammed went for the other option. His family
belonged to the communist political tradition that emphasizes Jewish-Arab relations.
But asked about the role of political demonstrations, Mohammed said he never went
to protests, explaining: ‘What I am trying to do is a demonstration, but for the better.
I won’t change the world, but I can change myself. Trying to change something for the
good: this is the basis on which I act’. To underline his argument, he invoked the Arabic
proverb ‘Those who come to you with evil, reply to them with good’ (Illi bijik bi-sharr,
taallo bi-kheir).
However, this belief in ‘goodness’ did not increase his sense of belonging in Tel
Aviv, which shows that negotiating the space of the ‘good Arab’ is primarily about
socioeconomic access and not about identity or recognition: ‘You will always feel
different’, Mohammed said, adding: ‘In your everyday life, and the way people treat
you. I tried to relate to this city, but in the end you just realize that it’s not yours, that
you don’t belong’. All this hard work did little to combat discrimination. ‘Let’s say I
want to go to a club’, he continued. ‘You show your ID, and they don’t let me in because
I am Arab’, he said. Whether in nightlife, at restaurants, or entering bus stations, Israel
has framed Palestinian men as especially dangerous people (Pasquetti 2013: 466), and
this distrust only increases their need to be validated as trustworthy citizens. Although
individual Palestinians cannot always escape estrangement and stigmatization, this does
not necessarily decrease their hope of beating the odds. In the words of Mohammed:
‘First they step on you, and then you have to slowly work yourself up, and they may
trust you’.
Making good business
The eatery where I met Mohammed was, as noted earlier, one of the few Palestinian-
owned places in ‘Jewish’ Tel Aviv, away from the Palestinian areas of the port city of
Jaffa further south. It became clear that Palestinian-owned businesses in Jewish Israeli
towns are under particular pressure to manage how they are perceived. The eatery run
by Sama and her husband had served customers with basic food for sixteen years, but
she admitted that if you are an Arab in Tel Aviv, ‘you are marked with an X’. Originally
from the northern town of Taybeh, she and her family decided to live permanently in Tel
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Aviv and send their children to a Jewish school. As we chatted in her restaurant, Sama
began talking about the war in Gaza, before assuring me that she did not support the
Hamas movement. On the wall hung an old photograph of Jaffa dated 1933, showing
a Palestine long lost: Tel Aviv’s ascent coincided with the destruction of Palestinian
urbanism as 95 per cent of Palestinians from Jaffa and other ‘mixed’ cities were forced
to leave homes that became repopulated by Jewish immigrants (Monterescu 2015: 2).
To this day, historic Jaffa serves as Tel Aviv’s orientalized and gentrified Arab neighbour,
while the history of Palestinians within Tel Aviv has been overwritten by its modern
Jewish Israeli image.
To run anArab business within Tel Avivwas unusual and required a careful balancing
act. While Sama complained about Israeli politics in Arabic, she repeatedly lowered her
voice and looked around nervously. The pressure on Palestinians not to be perceived as
nationalist was present in ‘liberal’ Tel Aviv. As Sama explained: ‘We live in Tel Aviv and
my children go to a Jewish school. There is a lot of hatred, but they are smart enough
not to interfere in these things’.
At the same time, the story of these businesses shows how Palestinians can turn their
Arabness into a validated trait of ‘goodness’, however orientalized it may be. While my
interactions with Sama were restricted to the lunch meeting withMohammed, I gained
a deeper understanding of a grocery in Tel Aviv run by a family from an Arab town
in the north. Their shop in Tel Aviv drew in customers with a wide selection of fresh
vegetables and good service. ‘You need two things’, said Abu Khaled, who ran the family
business:
You need to have one of the best shops, and it needs to have the best service. Your service has to be
better than the service of Jewish competitors. You need to be better than the Jews, so they come to
you. Seventy per cent of our customers come because of the good treatment.
Overall, entrepreneurship among Palestinians in Israel has had ‘strong ethnic
components’, some of which are said to serve as ‘buffers and cushions against failure
or difficulty’ (Meir & Baskind 2006: 79). The task is often to transform stigma into
recognized ‘ethnic’ values and explore profitable niches. The grocery in Tel Aviv had its
own strategies.
Oneday at the shop, I spoke toFadi, the 22-year-old sonofAbuKhaled,when a Jewish
customer walked in. ‘This is Yossi’, Fadi explained, as the man ordered cigarettes and
asked Fadi to ‘write it on the tab’. ‘What’s my bill adding up to?’ the man asked. ‘More
than 500 Shekel’, said Fadi with a smile. After Yossi left without paying, Fadi explained
that he was the owner of a nearby restaurant, and that people like him expected a special
service from them. Then another man passed by, and, without walking into the shop,
demanded his cigarettes through the window, which he immediately got from Fadi,
then walked on. As Fadi wrote this one on the tab too, he looked at me and said: ‘He is a
tour operator. When my elder brother flew to Europe for studying, he got us the ticket’.
Although someother groceries allowedpeople toput purchases on the tab, this family
appeared to offer special services because they needed to be a trusted Arab business.
On another day, I followed them back into their home town. As we sat together on
plastic chairs in front of their newly opened shop, I learned about their need to provide
better service than their Jewish competitors. This involved exploiting their Arabness
in a way that conformed to Jewish Israeli expectations. In their Tel Aviv shop, this
included selling fresh vegetables and home-made produce. Their tahini, for example,
came from a company run by some family members living in the city of Nablus in the
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West Bank. ‘You greet customers and you welcome them, you give them whatever they
need, you joke with them’, said Abu Khaled, hinting at characteristics of courtesy and
civility. Indeed, Palestinian citizens who run businesses for Jewish Israeli customers
often reiterate the terms of ‘an Orientalist archive’ recognizable to them (Stein 2008).
Abu Khaled’s father first opened the shop in Tel Aviv twenty-five years earlier, and
such an endeavour required strength: ‘There are strong fears about the reactions from
the city, from Jewish people. Their first thought of Arabs . . . is that that he is some sort
of criminal’, Abu Khaled said. To counter this suspicion, they have to prove themselves.
‘You have to impress. As an Arab in this country, you are facing a lot of questions and
you constantly have to prove that you are good’.
Abu Khaled admitted that he now contemplated closing down the Tel Aviv branch
of the shop because of costs, but Fadi hoped to open his own business in the city one
day. Although studying mechanical engineering, Fadi did a lot of work for the family
business, driving from their town to Tel Aviv and back, and picking up tahini from
their factory in Nablus. His plan to run a business in Tel Aviv had one shortcoming: he
would never want to live there. Instead, he envisioned building a large house on his own
land. Opening a business was the alternative to working as a mechanical engineer, a
profession in Israel wheremany of the relevant companies are connected to theweapons
industry. ‘I can’t work there; it is extremely hard to enter there as an Arab because of
security issues’, said Fadi. No matter how ‘good’ he would become in the eyes of this
industry, he would still be pre-emptively excluded.
As the day of my visit to their town came to an end, Fadi took me to a road-side cafe´,
where we sat down with a friend and smoked nargilah (water pipe). Although now in
Palestinian ownership, the place had a Hebrew sign outside: mifgash haverim (‘friends
meet-up’). The sun set and coloured the sky in a beautiful red, accompanied by the
Lebanese music videos that ran on a large TV screen. Fadi told me that he believed in
the ‘good’ impact their positive mind-set had on Jewish Israelis and their views about
‘Arabs’. Towards the end of a long conversation about their business and the city of Tel
Aviv, Fadi said:
Do you see this cup of coffee? Jewish society sees us as a small cup like this. But once they really see
us and get to know us, they often realize that there is more than that. From a young age, Jews in this
country learn that Arabs are something to be scared of. But I can also show them who I am, show
them that I am good.
Palestinian businesses in Israel face a dilemma very similar to that of individual
employees in search of jobs: their ethnonational difference is only validated as ‘good’
for as long as it conforms to predetermined standards and remains apolitical. These
businesses perceive their initial disadvantage to be so great that they see equal chances as
something that actually requires them to be unique and ‘better’. To become better than
others in order to succeed despite discrimination is an equally widespread aspiration
among young Palestinian citizens of Israel, many of whom attend university and stand
on the threshold of their careers.
Becoming better
When I first met Amira, she was a fresh business student at Tel Aviv University. She grew
up in a small Palestinian town in the north of Israel, which was known for having one of
the few mixed Jewish-Arab schools in the country. Many of Amira’s relatives studied at
this school and they all learned to speak Hebrew from an early age. Her father studied
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in Italy and had worked as a doctor in the village since then, while her mother worked
at a branch of Israel’s largest bank. Amira frames their town as a quintessential ‘good’
Arab town, saying that Jewish Israelis ‘are not scared to come to our town because
there is coexistence’, while they would be ‘very scared to enter Umm el-Fahm’, a town
in the same region that is known as the base of the outlawed northern branch of the
IslamicMovement. To her, studying in Tel Aviv and pursuing a career there represented
a trajectory that was rooted in her specific background.
Like many other young Arabs who move into Tel Aviv, Amira enjoyed the distance
from her home village. It gave her a sense of anonymity away from the gendered
surveillance that sometimes characterizes the lives of Palestinian women in Israel
(Herzog 2009). Yet, similar to the privileges attained within the space of the ‘good Arab’,
such gendered anonymity in the Jewish city remained conditional on the invisibility of
Palestinian political identity and any collective presence (Hackl 2018). Urban anonymity
and conditional inclusion both reinforce a certain Palestinian absence through a limited
‘permitted’ presence.
Amira had originally come to Tel Aviv to study Medicine in the belief she would not
be accepted to study Business ‘as an Arab’. After a first term, however, she decided to
follow her ambitions and switched to Business, despite her fears of being disadvantaged.
As the onlyArab inher class, she pushedherself very hard. Shewas drivenby the looming
threat of stigmatization. ‘It was the fear of always having to make up for being Arab’,
she told me during one meeting at university. Driven by this fear, Amira did ‘a lot of
self-learning’ in her free time, signed up for online courses with US universities, and
improved her English and Hebrew language skills.
Similar to other talented Palestinian students in Tel Aviv, Amira found a niche in
the city’s booming high-tech sector as an employee dealing with clients in the wider
Arab Middle East. Many Israeli companies dealing with foreign exchange, gambling,
or investment were officially based in Cyprus but operated from Tel Aviv. They relied
on Palestinian citizens and foreigners to build close relations with clients and investors
in Arab countries, without openly admitting to being located in Israel. This, in turn,
made it easier for citizens of those countries – some of which do not officially recognize
the State of Israel – to benefit from the selective openness of these relations. Similar
dynamics have occurred in Jewish Israeli tourism with its desire for ‘good’ Arabness,
including culinary traditions, authentic places, and cultural practices (Stein 2008: 6).
As a space of inclusion and interaction across conventional boundaries, the ‘good Arab’
facilitates subtle, and at times covert, relations between a settler colonial state and
its economy, on the one hand, and the Arab peoples it has historically had adverse
relations with, on the other hand – be they Palestinian citizens of Israel, or citizens of
neighbouring Arab states.
Amira soon changed employer and moved to one of Israel’s online marketing
companies, where she was once again responsible for selling services to the Arab region
over the phone, saying: ‘I set myself a challenge, which was to become the best seller’.
She used her affinity to customers in the Arab world and became very successful. Filling
a niche for Arabic-speakers was one thing, but getting a job against the competition of
equally qualified Jewish Israelis was harder. Ever since university, Amira had invested
efforts into countering the disadvantage:
Maybe I can volunteer in something humanitarian or anything else that proves strategic thinking,
showing that I belong to Israeli society. So, I have to work harder by myself in order to catch up with
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the level of Jewish colleagues. I am working hard so my marks will be higher than theirs and so I will
stand out when I am looking for a job.
Yet as much as she tried to make this stigma invisible through achievements and
goodwill, she worried about remaining unsuccessful:
There are still difficulties. Maybe I will be in the same position as the Jewish classmate, even more
exceptional, even on a higher scale, of better quality . . . The fear is that despite all efforts I invest,
they will prefer someone who went to the [Israeli] army.
For Amira, the drive to become better than others may have been an important
factor in her career. ‘Maybe all this success happened because I always had this fear’,
she told me in a later meeting during 2017, adding: ‘My parents always told me to be
realistic, that I will go back to the village and that I won’t be accepted as an Arab in these
firms in Tel Aviv’. Without doubt, the drive to get better was twofold here. Alongside
the gendered familial pressures, which involved widespread expectation that daughters
returned to their hometowns after graduation, she faced repeated rejections in her job
applications. One experience involved a company that did not call her back at first, but
when she submitted the same CV with a Jewish name, it did. ‘So I fought against this
as much as I could’.
One frustrating outcome for Palestinian citizens who are validated as ‘good Arabs’
is that they can cease to be recognized as Palestinians altogether. Amira recounted this
tendency among her colleagues, who asked:
‘What language do you speak?’ I said Arabic, and they were like, ‘Are you kidding me?’ The funny
thing is that some of them told me that I am not actually Arab. They couldn’t accept it . . . Even my
boss there [at the marketing company] continued to say that I am Italian, that I dress well like an
Italian, but when he learned that both my parents were Arab, and my mum from Umm el-Fahm, he
was shocked. He just kept on believing that I was Italian for so long.
This logic of forced absence locates Palestinian Arab spaces outside of Tel Aviv, in
Jaffa or Umm el-Fahm, and by the same logic, the ‘good Arab’ within Tel Aviv may
then no longer be Arab at all. Indeed, in Amira’s colleagues’ eyes she ceased to be Arab
altogether. This coincided with pressures to be highly individualized and detached from
the larger Palestinian community. This was a precondition of blending into Tel Aviv
unmarked. Such depoliticization camemore naturally inAmira’s case, who said, ‘I don’t
believe in politics. It’s bad energy for me. I believe in humanity. Good people exist in all
cultures’. The space of the ‘good Arab’ and its implicit logic of erasure is reinforced by
liberal urban culture. The process involves a form of ‘politicide’ bymaking the universal
criteria of citizenship, or even humanity, conditional on the elimination of political and
national difference.
At least in a pragmatic sense, ‘becoming better’ allowed Amira to gain confidence
as a professional. Confident after job experiences in leading companies, victories in
hackathons, and a university degree, she said: ‘I no longer have the fear I had before, that
people judge me and look at me only as an Arab. So now that I have overcome that fear,
I can do what I love to do’. Although accommodating and intentionally depoliticized,
these subtle struggles for access turn the ‘good Arab’ into a useful battleground for
socioeconomic inclusion, however limited it may be. As Amira experienced routinely
when shewas a student, even the ‘best’Arabs cannot escape the structural discrimination
imposed on Palestinian citizens as a community, and the Jewish majority’s suspicion
towards them. Indeed, ‘suspect Arabness casts its shadow even on “good Arabs”’
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(Kanaaneh 2009: 63), which is even true for thosewho declare their loyalty to the state by
joining the ranks of Israel’smilitary. In this sense,wheneverAmira entered theuniversity
gates, and the guards checked her ID, they recognized her Arab name and immediately
searched her bag, on the basis of that identification. Structural discrimination and
stigmatization routinely override the achievements made within the space of the good
Arab.
Settler colonialism and the predicament of conditional inclusion
Tracing the ‘good Arab’ from its origins into a contemporary urban setting, I have
revealed a hidden battleground of inclusion and access where the conditionality of
citizenship becomes visible in the daily compromises of individuals. This analysis
of the ‘good Arab’ explains how a logic of settler colonial erasure lives on within
contemporary spaces of citizenship and inclusion in liberal settler states. It shows how
the unfinished ‘histories’ of settler colonialism and dispossession continue to determine
the relationship between indigenous peoples and the spaces of settler majorities today.
As a sociopolitical category of recognition, the ‘good Arab’ allows us to see the various
inscriptions of a shared logic of conditional inclusion through time and across space.
Such conditional inclusion emerges as a key principle bywhich settler colonial citizenship
governs durable inequalities between settler majorities and indigenous peoples.
Dominant ‘protocols of recognition’ (Stein 2008) like the ‘good Arab’ are always
changeable. Yet there is striking historical continuity between colonial practices of
‘divide and rule’ and the liberal governance of indigenous minorities today. In spatial
terms, too, a similar logic can be observed across scales and boundaries: the social space
of the ‘good Arab’ manifests itself in the specific context of work or housing, on the
larger economic level of inclusion, and in the regional level of Israeli business relations
and tourism. What unites these scales of time and space despite their differences is
that settler states can maintain a framework of conditionality of access across a wide
spectrum of domestic and international relations with political Others.
The ‘good Arab’ further shows how settler logics turn inclusion and political
recognition intomutually exclusive goals forminority citizens, theonebeing conditional
on the absence of the other.While Palestinian citizens engagewith the social space of the
‘good Arab’ in the hope of evading overt exclusion and discrimination, their validation
as ‘good’ Arab citizens implicitly legitimizes settler sovereignty. We can say that once
empowerment is achieved within the framework of a state-orientated institution or
logic of misrecognition, ‘it reaffirms the legitimacy of domination by the majority and
represents integrative tendencies’ (Sorek 2007: 7).
Yet onemust acknowledge that certain kinds of agency simply come at the expense of
political visibility and ‘popular sovereignty’ (Bishara 2017). Althoughmuch is lost, some
things are gained as part of this process. Tel Aviv promises individual liberties, offers
socioeconomic benefits, and enables the situational destigmatization of difference to
whoever meets the underlying criteria. The implicit loss is that this process forecloses
equality the moment people aspire to it because the racialized recognition as a ‘good
Arab’ has its origins in the elimination of indigenous political power and identity. As
today’sminority citizens negotiate the requirements for being validated as a ‘goodArab’,
they simultaneously open new doors and reinforce existing glass ceilings.
These insights open up new spaces for comparison across indigenous rights
struggles and their experiences with so-called ‘national integration’ policies and
frameworks of liberal citizenship, which often have the adverse effect of undermining
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self-determination andautonomy (Hale 2011; Povinelli 2002; Speed 2017).Whena liberal
meritocratic ethos embraces indigenous individuals in settler spaces, a logic of political
control continues to structure the terms of socioeconomic inclusion: their access to
what is ‘liberal’ and ‘universal’ is made conditional on their perceived conformity with
the dominant protocol for recognition of their ethnocultural difference. This often
requires the suppression of the national dimension of their identity.
The irony is that access to universal equality remains alive as a potential but is
unattainable in its actuality. As the experience of Arab soldiers in Israel’s military
confirms, ‘even goodArabs are always potentially bad in a Jewish state’ (Kanaaneh 2009:
67). After all, it is the ever-present presumption of untrustworthiness that triggers the
requirement for proof of trustworthiness. The social significance of the ‘good Arab’
grows precisely because members of the Jewish Israeli majority often view Palestinians
as suspicious Others. Although aware of these wider implications, Palestinian citizens
in Tel Aviv pointed at the absence of viable alternatives. When your livelihood and your
career depend on the ability to navigate a society and economy that is dominated by the
settler majority, adapting to its requirements may be as undesirable as it is inevitable.
Reaching beyond the dichotomy of accommodation and resistance, the concept
of conditional inclusion illuminates the difficult compromises and balancing acts
that characterize relations between indigenous people and settler majorities. Once
grounded in detailed historical genealogies and specific spaces, the ‘good Arab’ and
other related metaphors of conditional inclusion can explain the complicated and
ambivalent intricacies of minority citizenship across a variety of political and regional
settings.
NOTES
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Le bon Arabe : inclusion conditionnelle et citoyennete´ coloniale parmi les
Palestiniens ayant la citoyennete´ israe´lienne dans la Tel Aviv juive
Re´sume´
Lesmajorite´s dominantes utilisent souvent des cate´gories ide´alise´es pour de´terminer qui, parmi les citoyens
appartenant aux minorite´s, est « bon » et me´ritant. Pour les citoyens israe´liens d’origine palestinienne,
cette cate´gorie est celle du « bon Arabe ». Depuis son apparition au de´but de l’installation des Juifs en
Palestine, elle est devenue une me´taphore puissante et controverse´e dans le discours public israe´lien. Parce
qu’elle renvoie a` l’expe´rience d’une inclusion limite´e, la notion du « bon Arabe » illustre le dilemme
palestinien de l’acce`s aux opportunite´s socioe´conomiques de l’espace juif israe´lien, qui stigmatise et
rejette leur identite´ ethno-nationale. En combinant une ge´ne´alogie historique du « bon Arabe » avec
une recherche ethnographique parmi les Palestiniens de Tel Aviv, le pre´sent article montre comment la
logique historique de controˆle par les colons et d’effacement des autochtones continue a` de´finir les cadres
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libe´raux de la citoyennete´ et de l’inclusion conditionnelles. The´orise´es a` travers le concept e´mergent de
l’inclusion conditionnelle, ces conside´rations ouvrent de nouvelles pistes d’analyse et de comparaison dans
les de´bats anthropologiques sur les luttes autochtones, la colonisation de peuplement, l’inclusion urbaine
et la citoyennete´.
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